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HomeMy WebLinkAbout201103024ttGTON .GG WASHINGTON COUNTYii I. HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION 1 y �) A �� `��- '-7 621. ��G2¢'1L�C' l�C! Washington County Administrative Annex 80 West Baltimore Street ()U' -i% G, Hagerstown, Maryland 21740-6003 ' Telephone: 240-313-2430 FAX: 240-313-2431 �'�epnn�9 Deaf and Hard of Hearing call 7-1-1 for Maryland Relay /.i (, \59() fn AGENDA HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, MARYLAND CONFERENCE ROOM 1A & B WASHINGTON COUNTY ADMINISTRATIVE ANNEX 80 WEST BALTIMORE STREET MARCH 2, 2011 7:00PM M REGULAR MEETING AGENDA - 7:00 PM A. Call to Order & Roll Call B. Minutes — February 2, 2011 January 5, 2011 C. Communications & Bills 1. Cell tower information — 23523 Foxville Road, Smithsburg D. Unfinished Business 1. Continue Design Guidelines Discussion 2. Continue review RZ-11-001 — IM zoning for Holcim Security Quarry * E. Budget F. New Business G. Other Business H. Closed Session I. Adjournment * = written material enclosed \HDC\Amar2011.DOC NOTICE IS GIVEN THAT THE HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION MAY MEET IN CLOSED SESSION PURSUANT TO SECTION 10.508, STATE GOVERNMENT ARTICLE, ANNOTATED CODE OP MARYLAND. INDIVIDUALS REQUIRING SPECIAL ACCOMMODATIONS ARE REQUESTED TO CONTACT THE WASHINGTON COUNTY PLANNING DEPARTMENT. CONTACT PLANNING DEPARTMENT AT (240) 313-2430 VOICE/TDD TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS NO LATER THAN TEN (10) WORKING DAYS PRIOR TO THE MEETING. - www.Washco-md. net - RECYCLED PAPER BURGESS & NIPLE Burgess & Niple, Inc. 12700 Black Forest Lane Suite 100 Woodbridge, VA 22192 703 670.6400 Fax 703 670.6250 Washington County Department of Planning and Community Development ATTN: Mr. Stephen Goodrich 80 West Baltimore Street Hagerstown, MD 21740 February 11, 201 1 Dear Mr. Goodrich: Re: Information Request and Review Request Hopkins Ridge Liberty Towers Property 23523 Foxville Road Smithsburg, Maryland 21783 Washington County Parcel Number 52-3-66 (portion) Latitude/Longitude: 39°38' 14.90"N/77°32'57.58"W We are requesting any information and comments you may have regarding reported or potential occurrence of national historic and cultural landmarks or buildings in the proposed project area shown on the attached site location map. The project is a proposed telecommunications tower to be located at 23523 Foxville Road in Smithsburg, Maryland 21783 in Washington County. The property is owned by the South Mountain Rod and Gun Shop and is located on a portion of Parcel Number 52-3-66. If you have any questions or need any additional information, contact me at (703) 670-6400 or via e-mail at anna.dougherty@burgessniple.com. Thank you in advance for your prompt attention to our request. Sin erely, dtherty, PWD Environmental Scientist Enclosures ?1t T )Mtjtllt�t��s 1T! 19 1 2 SMWsB11jRd77 I IOLIDAY ACRES / ,W rr o �p i t r0 Town' / � Ilal y 4 ky q .r, .EYBo n /` ppWUs E °Si if 1',rpo ,EPA YE sEr UR t n e ery e erv. 0 'fl 1 GHUP(:H G VE'pOWN 844 G JA pd'F. IG Gp ,�arel Wn N 22 RGFAAL Waahinaro o U CAVET WN oavGmpn ViIIsq.., Sgoa, ' Shop C , V: U U S II Burgess & Niple, Inc. I SITE LOCATION MAP Copyright ADC The Map People I Of I II Permitted Use Number: J Liberty Towers Hopkins Ridge Property Jj206081612 Washington County, Maryland I ii WASHINGTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT Washington County Administrative Annex 80 West Baltimore Street Hagerstown, Maryland 21740-6003 Telephone: 240-313-2430 FAX: 240-313-2431 Deaf and Hard of Hearing call 7-1-1 for Maryland Relay February 15, 2011 Ms Anna Dougherty, PWD Environmental Scientist Burgess & Niple, Inc. 12700 Black Forest Lane Suite 100 Woodbridge, VA 22192 RE: Liberty Towers Proposed tower at 23523 Foxville Road Dear Ms Dougherty: Thank you for the opportunity to provide information regarding a proposed cell tower at 23523 Foxville Road in Washington County, MD. I would offer the following comments for consideration in the pursuit of approval of a tower at this location. We have provided similar comments to Mr. Gary Holliday of your firm in response to a similar request dated 2/4/11. There are no sites identified in the local historic inventory within a'/2 mile radius of the site. There may be undocumented historic sites in the vicinity that we are not aware of. You should also contact the Maryland Historical Trust to determine if there are sites listed in the Maryland Inventory of Historic Properties that we are not aware of. The Appalachian Trail is within the'/2 mile radius of the proposed site. Washington County has identified the Appalachian Trail in its Comprehensive Plan as a Special Planning Area. It requires identification on subdivision plats and site plans and may require special setbacks. Washington County's Subdivision and Zoning Ordinances and the Comprehensive Plan are available for reference on-line at www.washco-md.net. Although located approximately 2 miles to the northwest, the Town of Smithsburg (MIHP# WA -IV -259) contains a historic core that may be National Register eligible. A cell tower or "Commercial Communication Tower" is a special exception in the Environmental Conservation zoning district which exists on the site and will require approval from the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA). It is routine for the BZA to request comments from the Historic District Commission (HDC) on the effects of cell towers on historic sites. When referred by the Board of Zoning Appeals, the Planning staff, Planning Commission or HDC will likely recommend that the BZA give serious www.washco_md.net RECYCLED PAPER Ms Anna Dougherty February 15, 2011 Page 2 consideration to the visibility of the proposed tower from the Appalachian Trail and potential negative effects it may have on the trail viewshed. In order to adequately assess the visibility and effects of potential cell towers, the HDC routinely recommends to the BZA that cell tower applications contain an analysis of the visibility from sensitive sites including balloon tests and photo simulations of the tower from these locations. Also, if your request to the Maryland Historical Trust reveals that there are identified sites not included in the local inventory, that information should be provided in the appeal application. It is recommended that the MD DNR and the Appalachian Trail Conservancy be included in your requests for information and participation in the review process. Contact information is provided below. Any comments you receive should be included in your application package to the Board of Zoning Appeals. Karen Lutz Mid -Atlantic Reg. Director. Appalachian Trail Conservancy 4 East First St. Boiling Springs, PA 17001 717/258-5771 W 717/258-1442 Fax 717/580-4247 C klutz@appalachiantrail.org Lee Sheaffer President PATC 943 Castlerock Ln. Berryville, VA22611 540/955-0736 H 703/771-3495W thumyers@wave2net.com Thank you for the opportunity to comment. Stg/me Cc: Gary S. Holliday, Burgess & Niple Karen Lutz Pam Underhill Lee Sheaffer Daniel P. Spedden Kathy Kroboth, Zoning Coordinator Pam Underhill NPS Manager Appl. Trail Park Office PO Box 50 Harpers Ferry, WV 25425 304/728-8018 H 304/535-6278 W Pamela_underhill@nps.gov Daniel P. Spedden Park Manager South Mountain Recreation Area 21843 National Pike Boonsboro MD 21713 Office 301.791.4656 Fax 301.791.0962 Cell 240.285.3481 dspeddeu@dnr.state.md.us Sincerely, Stephen T. Goodrich Chief Planner �SI6k/ /ll�L'�/�L Page 1of3 JJ (� u/SC0_TS�6 Gogdrich, Steve From: C Kegerise [CKegerise@mdp.state.md.us] Sent: Thursday; February 17, 2011 5:33 PM To: Chris Horst Cc: Goodrich, Steve Subject: RE: Washington County HDC Design Guidelines Attachments: Assessing_Economic_Hardship.pdf Dear Chris, My sincerest apologies for the amount of time it's taken me to respond. I had this on my to do list, but didn't realize just how long ago you sent your message. I hope you still find this. information relevant. The simple answer to your question is that cost should not impact the Commission's application of the Design Guidelines, and the reasons for that are primarily legal in nature. Forgive me if I get a bit legalistic here, but I think it will help you understand the essence of the argument and the process I'm J going to suggest you follow. (That being said, I'm not a lawyer, so don't consider this to be legal advice — only the County Attorney can provide that). The HPC's obligation and duty is to objectively evaluate a project and apply the relevant design guidelines. County Code requires you to consider only four factors when reviewing an application (Section 20.6[b]): - The historical or architectural significance or the property - The relationship of the exterior architectural features to the remainder of the structure and surrounding area - General compatibility of exterior design, scale, proportion, arrangement, texture, and materials proposed to be used - Other factors, including aesthetics, the Commission deems to be pertinent This language is drawn directly from State legislation (Article 66B, Section 8.06b, Annotated Code of Maryland). Neither the statute nor the county code identify the cost of the proposed changes as a factor the HPC should consider when rendering a decision on an application. One could argue that cost could fit into the "other factors" category, but that is not standard practice and creates a slippery slope that you need' to be very cautious of. The rationale here is that there is virtually always a cheaper way to do something, and the mere fact that complying with a regulation or guidelines has a higher cost shouldn't be the measure by which you make a decision. That reasoning goes against the whole purpose and rationale of the law. Think of a zoning issue as an example. I want to erect a new pre-fab shed in my back yard and the zoning code in my town requires a 3 foot setback from the property line. However, the shed I really want and can afford will only fit in my yard if I situate it less than one foot from the line. I would have to build a custom shed in order to conform with the zoning code, and that would cost 50% more than the pre-fab version. The zoning officer has no right or obligation to give me my permit for the non -conforming shed simply because it would cost less than a conforming structure. Presumably that regulation exists for a public purpose and it is the zoning officer's decision to uphold that regulation and ensure that the purpose is satisfied. 1 may be able to appeal the zoning officer's determination and obtain a variance because complying with the code would create a hardship for me, but when determining whether or not 02/22/2011 Page 2 of 3 my proposal meets the code, the zoning officer doesn't have the right to take my cost arguments into consideration. Legally, the HPC is a quasi-judicial body, the same as the zoning officer and the Planning Commission and therefore, you're only allowed to consider the factors the County Council (and by extension the General Assembly) allow you to consider. By basing your approval or denial of an application on how much it costs, you run the risk of violating an applicant's due process and equal protection rights and completely subverting the intent of the HP law. So what should you do? The State legislation allows HPC's to approve applications if "retention of the site or structure would cause undue financial hatdship to the owner" (Article 66B, Section 8.10[2]). The County Code doesn't specifically spell this out, but in cases where there is an inconsistency between State and local law, State law prevails. It's clear that this specific provision was written with demolition in mind, but if you read the entirety of Section 8.10 you'll see that it obviously applies to applications for all forms of exterior alterations. However, the key words in that clause are "undue financial hardship." The fact that compliance with the law will cost more than what I'd like to pay for the project is rarely enough to constitute hardship. I've attached an article from the National Trust on this issue that will describe hardship much more eloquently than I could do myself. There are two points that are critical here: 1. There needs to be a decision for there to be a hardship 2. The hardship needs to be undue and substantial. Again, the increased cost could be considered a hardship, but you are only obligated to provide relief when that hardship is "undue." So, the most appropriate place for the Commission to address this is in your rules of procedure. Your guidelines should then seek to explain the procedure laid out in the Rules. The County's code is a bit odd and not completely in sync with the State enabling legislation on several points that are relevant to this discussion. First, Article 66B, Section 8.06 says that "a local jurisdiction shall adopt guidelines for rehabilitation and new construction." We interpret that to mean that guidelines must be adopted by the County in order to be valid (again think of your guidelines as akin to zoning regulations). The second part of Section 8.06 al says that the guidelines must be "consistent with those generally recognized by the Maryland Historical Trust." We interpret that phrase to mean the Secretary of the Interior's Standards for the Treatment of Historic Properties, therefore the County's guidelines must be based upon the Standards. A good analogy for this is Robert's Rules of Order. Most organizations have their own specific rules, but Robert's Rules are the fall back when that document doesn't address the specific question. The Code's language that the Standards are an optional framework for decision -making is inconsistent with this notion. I know this is a lot to digest, so have a look at the attached and give me a call if you'd like to discuss. Cory Cory R. Kegerise LEED GA Administrator of Local Preservation Programs Maryland Historical Trust (410) 514-7635 http://mht.maryland.gov 02/22/2011 Page 3 of 3 From: Chris Horst [mailto:chorst_99@hotmail.com] Sent: Saturday, January 22, 2011 12:25 PM To: C Kegerise Subject: Washington County HDC Design Guidelines Mr. Kegerise, I don't believe we've ever met so Td like to introduce myself; I'm Washington County's Historic District Commission chair. The Commission has been actively working on a draft design. guidelines for our county and that is why I am contacting you today. We have in the past on a number of occasions faced the question of how to appropriately apply the Secretary's Standards to a specific design review cases when the applicants financial situation is such that the design changes we are suggesting will cost the applicant more money than their design. It is unclear to us how we should handle this situation as on one hand it is no surprise that incorporating design elements that are in keeping with the style and period of the house, its neighbohood, etc. can be more costly than a simple, and less expensive choice that would not be appropriate to the structure or its setting. To further complicate the question we also recognize that whether a structure is a significant resource or a contributing structure has an impact on our decision if we are speaking of Washington County's Rural Villages or a National Register property. Can you provide us any guidance on how to handle this issue of the economics of the decisions we make? We'd like to be clear about this issue when we write about it in our design guidelines in order to inform the property owener about what to expect when their designs come to our Commission as well as to help the Commission understand what our position should be. Thanks for any assistance you can provide. Chris Horst Washington County HDC Chairperson 301-991-2041 02/22/2011 Assessing Economic Hardship Claims under historic preservation ordinances By Julia Millet FTistoric preservation ordinances in effect around the country often include a process for administrative relief from preservation restriction in situations of "econom- ic hardship." Under typical economic hardship procedures, an applicant may apply for a "certificate of economic hard- ship" after a preservation commission has denied his or her request to alter or demolish a historic property protected under a preservation ordinance. In support of an applica- tion for relief on economic hardship grounds, the applicant must submit evidence sufficient to enable the decision mak- ing body to render a decision. The type of evidence required is generally spelled out in preservation ordinances or interpreting regulations. Tire burden of proof is on the applicant. The exact maturing of the term "economic hardship" 'epends on how the standard is defined in the ordinance, -lei many preservation ordinances economic hardship is .-.med as consistent with the legal standard for an uncon- stitutional regulatory taking, which requires a property owner to establish that he or she has been denied all reasom able beneficial use or return on the property as a result of the commission's denial of a permit for alteration or demoli- tion. Requests for relief on economic hardship grounds are usual- ly decided by historic preservation commissions, although some preservation ordinances allow the commission's deci- sion to be appealed to the city council. In some jurisdic- tions, the commission may be assisted by a hearing officer, A few localities have established a special economic review panel, comprised of members representing both the devel- opment and preservation community. Economic Impact In acting upon an application for a certificate of economic hardship, a commission is required to determine whether the economic impact of a historic preservation law, as applied to the property owner, has risen to the level of eco- nomic hardship. Thus, the first and most critical step in ^derstanding economic hardship is to understand how to .rate economic impact. Commissions should look at a variety of factors in evaluat- ing the economic impact of a proposed action on a particu- lar property, Consideration of expenditures alone will not provide a complete or accurate picture of economic impact, whether income -producing property or owner -occupied resi- dential property. Revenue, vacancy rates, operating expens- es, financing, tax incentives, and other issues arc all rele- vant considerations. With respect to income -producing property, economic impact is generally measured by look- ing at the effect of a particular course of action on a proper- ty's overall value or return. This approach allows a com- mission to focus on the 'bottom line' of the transaction rather than on individual expenditures, in addition to economic impact, the Supreme Court has said that "reasonable" or "beneficial use" of the property is also an important factor. Thus, in evaluating an economic hard- ship claim based on the constitutional standard for a regula- tory taking, commissions will need to consider an owner's ability to continue to carry out the traditional use of the property, or whether another viable, use for the property remains. in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 1 04 (1978), the landmark decision uphold- ing (fie use of preservation ordinances to regulate historic property, the Supreme Court found that a taking did not arise because the owner could continue to use its property as a railroad station. The Supreme Court has also said that the applicant's "reason- able investment -backed expectations" should be taken into consideration. Although the meaning of this phrase has not been delineated with precision, it is clear that "reasonable" expectations do not include those that are contrary to law. Titus, an applicant's expectation of demolishing a historic property subject to a preservation ordinance at the time of purchase (or subject to the likelihood of designation and reg- ulation) may not be considered "reasonable." Also pertinent is whether the owner's objectives were realistic given the condition of the property at the time of purchase, or whether the owner simply overpaid for the property. Under takings law, government is not required to compensate property own- ers for bad business decisions. Nor is the government required to guarantee a return on a speculative investment, 16 NEWS from tbt NATIONAI. ALLIANCE of PRESERVATION COMMISSIONS Commissions may also he able to take into account whether the alleged hardship is "self created." Clearly relevant is v her the value of the property declined or rehabilitation e.;n-nses increased because the owner allowed the building to deteriorate, Application of the takings standard in the context of invest- ment or income -producing property is usually fairly straightforward. The issue can be more complex, however, in situations involving hardship claims raised by homeown- ers In the context of homeownership, it is extremely diffi- cul. for an applicant to meet the standard for a regulatory taking, that is, to establish that he or she has been denied all reasonable use of the property. When it commission insists that houses be painted rather that) covered with vinyl siding, and windows be repaired rather than replaced, the applicant can still live in the house, The. fact that these repairs may be more costly is not enough. Even if extensive rehabilita- tion is required the applicant must show that the house can- not be sold "as is," or that the fair market value of the prop- erty in its current condition plus rehabilitation expenditures will exceed the fair market value of the house upon rehabil- itation. See City of Pittsburgh v. Weinborg 676 A.2d 207 (Pa.l9 6 . It is also important to note that "investment - hacked expectations" are different in the context of home o• 'rship, owners often invest in home improvements or re vations without the expectation of recouping the full cost of the improvement in the form of increased property value. In addressing hardship claims involving historic homes, commissions must be careful to be objective and consistent in their approach. Otherwise, a commission may undermine the integrity of its preservation program and raise due process concerns as well. Ideally, grant money, tax relief, and other programs should be made available to historic homeowners who need financial assistance. Special standards for economic hardship may apply to non- profit organizations. Because these entities serve charitable rather titan commercial purposes, it is appropriate to focus on the beneficial use of their property, rather than rate of return, taking into account the particular circumstances of the owner (i.e„ the obligation to serve a charitable purpose). in such situations, hardship analysis generally entails look- ing at a distinct set of questions, such as: the organization's charitable purpose, whether the regulation interferes with the organization's ability to carry out its charitable purpose, the condition of the building and the need and cost for re , s, and whether the organization can afford to pay for the repairs, if required. (Note, however, that while consid- oration of financial impact may be appropriate, a nooprolit organization is not entitled to relief simply on the basis that it could raise or retain more money without the restriction The Proceeding Under a typical hardship process, the applicant will be required to submit specific evidence in support of his or her claim. Once a completed application has been filed, a hear- ing will be scheduled, at which time the applicant generally presents expert testimony in support of the economic hard- ship claim on issues such as the structural integrity of the historic building, estimated costs of rehabilitation, and the projected market value of the property after rehabilitation, Once the applicant has presented its case, parties in opposi- tion or others may then present their own evidence, The commission may also bring in its own expert witnesses to testify. As noted above, the burden of proof rests on the property owner, lit hearing economic hardship matters, commissions must be prepared to make a legally defensible decision based on all the, evidence presented. In the event of conflicting expert testimony, which is often the case in economic hard- ship proceedings, the commission will need to weigh the evidence, making specific findings on the relative credibili- ty or competency of expert witnesses. In evaluating the evidence, the commission should ask itself five distinct questions: 1. Is the evidence sufficient? Does the commission have all the information it needs to understand the entire picture, or is something missing. The application is not complete unless all the required information has been submitted, If additional information is needed, risk for it. 2. is the evidence relevant? Weed out any information that is nor relevant to the issue of economic hardship in the case before you. Commissions may be given more information than they need or information that is not germane to the issues, such as how much money the project could make if the historic property were demolished. The property owner is not entitled to the highest and best use of the property, 3. is the evidence competent? Make an assessment as to whether the evidence establishes what it purports to show. 4. is the evidence credible? Consider whether the evidence is believable. For example, ask whether the figures make sense. A commission will need to take into consideration the source of the evidence and its reliability. (if the evi- dence is based on expert testimony, the commission should determine whether the expert is biased or qualified on the issue being addressed, For example, it may matter whether 'l t R Janar-F<6naan 200? 17 I a contractor testifying on rehabilitation expenditures actual - has experience in doing historic rehabilitations.) s Me evidence eonsislenr? Look for inconsistencies in tie testimony or the evidence submitted. Request that inconsistencies he explained. If there is contradictory evi- dence, the commission needs to determine which evidence is credible and why. In many instances the applicant's own evidence will fail to establish economic hardship, However, in some situations, the question may be less clear, The participation of preser- vation organizations in economic hardship proceedings can be helpful in developing the record. Commissions should also he prepared to hire or obtain experts of their own, For example. if a property owner submits evidence from a structural engineer that the property is structurally unsound, the ctnnmission may need to make an independent determi- nation, through the use of a governmental engineer or other qualified expert, as to the accuracy of that information. It may he impossible to evaluate the credibility or competency of information submitted without expert advice, The record as a whole becomes exceedingly important if the case goes to court, Under most standards of judicial review, decision will be uphold if it is supported by substantial 'knee. Thus, in conducting administrative proceedings, .s Important that evidence provides a true and accurate story of the facts and circumstances and that the cotnmis- sion's decision is based directly on that evidence. EYLDENTIARY CHECKLIST The following checklist may serve as a useful tool for local commissions and other regulatory agencies considering eco- nomic hardship claims: 1. Current level of economic return: • Amount paid for the property, date of' purchase, party from whom purchased, and relationship between the owner of record, the applicant, and person from whom property was purchased, • Annual gross and net income front the property for the previous three years; itemized operating and maintenance expenses for the previous three years, and depreciation deduction and annual cash flow before and after debt ser- vice, if any, during the same period, • Remaining balance on the mortgage or other financing secured by the property and annual debt -service, if any, "wing the prior three years, :al estate noes for the previous four years and assessed value of the property according to the two most recent assessed valuations, All appraisals obtained within the last two years by the owner or applicant in connection with the purchase, financing, or ownership of the property, • Form of ownership or operation of the property, whether sole proprietorship, for-profit or not -for-profit corporation, limited partnership, joint venture, or other. • Any state or federal income tax returns relating to the property for the last two years. 2. Any listing of property for sale or rent, price asked, and offers received, if any within the previous two years, including testimony and relevant documents regarding: • Any real estate broker or firm engaged to sell or lease the property, • Reasonableness of price or rent sought by the applicant, • Any advertisements placed for the sale or rent of the prop- erty. 3, Feasibility of alternative uses for the property that could earn a reasonable economic return: • Report from a licensed engineer or architect with experi once in rehabilitation as to the structural soundness of any buildings on the property and their suitability for rehabili- tation, • Cost estimates for the proposed construction, alteration, demolition, or removal, and an estimate of any additional cost that would he incurred to comply with the require- ments for a certificate of appropriateness, • Estimated market value of' the property: (a) in its current condition, (b) after completion of the proposed, alteration or demolition, and (c) after renovation of the existing property for continued use, 4. Any evidence of self-created hardship through deliberate neglect or inadequate maintenance of the property, 5. Knowledge of landmark designation or potential designa- tion at time of acquisition. 6. Economic incentives and/or funding available to the applicant through federal, state, city, or private programs. a Julia Miller works in the Law and Public Policy office at the National nusl,/br Historic Preservation. 18 NEWS from 1h: NATIONAL ALLIANCE of PRESERVATION COMMISSIONS City of Pittsburgh v. Weinberg, 676 A. 2d 207 - Pa: Supreme Court 1996 - Google Scholar Page l of 5 Web Images Videos MTos News Shopping Gmail more ♦ Scholar Preferences I Sign In Google scholar '.. _:.._�..._,. .. �._._ %!:L".Ce:rii• Advanced Schdar Search this case fHowcited I City of Pittsburah v. Weinberg, 676 A. 2d 207 - Pa: Supreme Court 1996 Highlighting Pittsburgh v. weinberg Remove highlighting 544 Pa. 286 (1996) 676 A.2d 207 CITY OF PITTSBURGH, Historic Review Commission, "`—�—�Cppellants, v. Alvin WEINBERG and Shirley Weinberg, his wife, Appellees. Supremdcourt of Pennsylvania. Argued September 21, 1995. Decided May 21, 1998. 287 '287 Jacqueline R. Morrow, George R. Specter, Pittsburgh, for City of Pittsburgh and Historic Review Com'n. Alexandra E. Acosta, Washington, DC, Brenda Barrett, Harrisburg, for Amicus Curiae. Ellen H. Wymard, Pittsburgh, for City of Pittsburgh. John Flash, Pittsburgh, for Alvin and Shirley Weinberg. Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ. OPINION . NIX, Chief Justice. The City of Pittsburgh, Historic Review Commission ("Commission") appeals from the Order of the Commonwealth Court which affirmed the Allegheny Court of Common Pleas' reversal of the Commission's refusal to grant a certificate of appropriateness for the demolition of a designated historic structure. We granted allocatur in order to review the standard used by the lower courts in determining that Appellees, Alvin and Shirley Weinberg, met their burden of proving that they would suffer economic hardship as a result of the Commission's action. Because we find that Appellees failed to demonstrate that they could not make any economic use of their property, we agree with the Commission's decision to deny permission to demolish the structure, and therefore, reverse the Order of the Commonwealth Court. The structure at Issue In this case is the Howe -Childs -Gateway House ("Gateway House" or 288 "House"), which Is '288 located at the southeast corner of Fifth Avenue and Woodland Road in the City of Pittsburgh. The Gateway House was designated an historic structure in April 1986 pursuant to a Pittsburgh ordinance governing designation and preservation of historic structures and historic districts. The Gateway House, a two and one-half story frame dwelling, was erected around 1860 in the Gothic Revival style and is a part of what was known as Fifth Avenue's Millionaire's Row. At the time of its designation as an historic structure, the Gateway House was owned by Greystone Associates ("Greystone"), the developer of a townhouse project in the area of the House. The City Planning Commission approved the Greystone project subject to conditions which, Inter alia, required the developer to pursue designation of the Gateway House as a local historic structure and submit all plans for the renovation of the House to the Historic Review Commission for review and approval. Greystone pursued designation but never renovated the Gateway House. In February 1988, within two years of designation of the Gateway House as an historic structure, the developer sold the property to Appellees. Appellees had entered into an agreement to purchase a new townhouse from Greystone. When Appellees became aware that there were drainage problems at the site of the townhouse, they wanted to be released from the transaction. Greystone was willing to release them If Appellees agreed to purchase the Gateway House. Greystone sold the house and lot to Appellees for $175,000. No mortgage was Involved in the transaction. After Greystone sold the property to Appellees, the Gateway property was reassessed at $40,000, which represented an estimated fair market value of $160,000. When Appellees bought the Gateway property (structure and land), they knew that the house . had been designated an historic structure and would be subject to restrictions imposed by the Pittsburgh Ordinance. These restrictions included a prohibition on altering or demblfshing the structure unless the owner obtained from the Commission a certificate of appropriateness allowing such action. City of Pittsburgh v. Weinberg, 676 A. 2d 207 - Pa: Supreme Court 1996 - Google Scholar Page 2 of 5 289 *289 The Gateway House, when acquired by Appellees, was in a dilapidated condition. Because they intended to use the House as their residence, Appellees obtained the Commission's permission to have certain restoration work done, Their contractor indicated he could not guarantee the work because the House had serious structural problems. When Appellees discovered that Pittsburgh National Bank would not grant a mortgage to finance the cost of rehabilitation because the House did not meet the bank`s collateral requirements, W Appellees sought a certificate of appropriateness from the Commission to demolish the house. It was their intention to replace it with a new brick house. None of the restrictive covenants in the deed from Greystone to Appellees would prevent AppeNees from doing so. The Commission conducted a hearing on Appellees' application for a certificate of appropriateness. No verbatim record of the testimony was made. The Commission refused to grant a certificate, and Appellees appealed to the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. That court remanded the matter to the Commission to make a full and complete record. The Commission subsequently held hearings on June 7 and August 2, 1991. At the first hearing, Appellees presented the testimony of Douglas Berryman, an architect, and Lee Goldblum, a realtor. Mr. Berryman testified that the Gateway House was in poor condition but not to the point that It could not be restored. R.R. at 186a-191 a). The contractors estimated cost of restoring the Gateway House was $567,000.0 (R. R. at 193a). The architect's fee for the project was estimated at $35,500. (R.R. at 199a). In order to construct a new brick house 290 on the site following demolition of the Gateway `290 House, Mr. Berryman estimated that it would cost in the range of $570,000 to $600,000. (R.R. at 201 a). Appellees also presented the testimony of Lee Goldblum, a realtor with the Howard Hanna Real Estate Company. Mr. Goldblum opined that a house renovated as two separate units could be marketed for $250,000 each and a single family residence might sell in the range of $500,000 to $550,000. (R.R. at 243a, 245a). He further testified that a new house built on the site of the Gateway House could be worth $800,000. (R.R. at 250a). Mr. Goldblum also recounted for the Commission his experience in trying to sell the Gateway property. He stated that there were many people who expressed interest in the property during the time that it was marketed by his firm; however, no one was willing to commit the resources necessary to restore the house to a suitable condition. (R.R. at 252a -253a). Finally, Mr. Goldblum speculated that the Gateway House could be sold In the two -hundred -thousand dollar range in unimproved condition, although he conceded that it would be impossible to know for sure "without trying to market it full till." T.R. at 253a, 272a -274a). On August 2, 1991, the Commission reconvened in order to reach a decision on Appellees' request for a certificate of appropriateness to demolish the Gateway House. At, that time, the findings and recommendation of the Commission's staff were submitted to the Commission for consideration. After deliberation, the Commission voted to accept the findings and recommendation of the staff. Specifically, the Commission found that the demolition of the Gateway House would destroy a structure of major historical and architectural significance; that the Gateway House was not structurally unsound; that Appellees knew of the historic designation of the house and the ramifications of such a designation;' and that renovations would cost (excluding purchase price and interim expenses) approximately $650,000 for a single-family house with garage and $700,000 for a two -unit residence with two garages. (R.R. at 292a -294a, 296a -297a). The Commission also noted that "the purchase price should 291 not be used as an *291 element of the hardship argument, since a mistakenly high payment for the building was a matter under the control of the owners." (R.R. at 297a). The end result of the Commission's deliberations was the denial of Appellees' application for demolition of the Gateway House. Appellees appealed the Commission's adjudication to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. The trial court reversed on the basis that the record did not support the Commission's finding that Appellees failed to meet their burden of showing that the sale of the Gateway House was impracticable. Weinberg v. City of Pittsburgh, Historic Review Common, No. SA981 of 1990, slip op. at 28 (C.P. Allegheny County Nov. 29, 1993). The court held that the Commission erred as a matter of law In concluding that Mr. Goldblum's testimony concerning the fair market value of the house was equivocal and, thus, incompetent. Id. at 20. The common pleas court found nothing Inherently unreliable In Mr. Goldblum's testimony that the fair market value of the house after renovation would be less than the cost of renovation. Id. at 24. Based on its interpretation of Mr. Goldblum's testimony, the court concluded that renovating the Gateway House was not economically feasible because the cost of renovations would be greater than the fair market value of the property after the house was renovated. Id. at 31. The Commission appealed to the Commonwealth Court. In affirming the trial court's decision, the Commonwealth Court found that "there was substantial evidence supporting the conclusion of the Commission that the cost of renovation as a single family residence was about $650,000 to $700,000, and there was no substantial evidence that the cost of renovating the property would not exceed the value of the property after renovation." Weinberg v. City of Pittsburgh, Historic Review Comm'n, 651 A.2d 1182, 1188 (Pa.Cmwlth.1994). It agreed with the trial court that It was not economically feasible for Appellees or any subsequent owners to undertake renovation of the Gateway House. Id. 292 •292 In reaching its determination that the Gateway House could not be renovated in an economically feasible manner, the Commonwealth Court relied on the seminal United States Supreme Court case Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. In Penn Central, the Land and Central Terminal as a City of Pittsburgh v. Weinberg, 676 A. 2d 207 - Pa: Supreme Court 1996 - Google Scholar Page 3 of 5 landmark. The owner of the terminal subsequently entered into a contract with a company to construct a multi -story office tower over the terminal. The Preservation Commission rejected the plans for the office tower construction because it believed that the terminal's historic and aesthetic features would have been adversely affected. The owner did not seek judicial review of that decision but instead flied suit in state court claiming that the historic designation constituted a taking of its property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The trial court agreed and held that the landmarks law, as applied to the owner, was unconstitutional. The New York Court of Appeals ultimately reversed that decision. The United States Supreme Court affirmed and held that the law did not constitute a taking of the owners property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138. 98 S Ct. at 2666 57 L.Ed.2d at 657. The Supreme Court in Penn Central reaffirmed the principle that "[s]tates and cities may enact land -use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city." 438 U.S. at 129. 98 S.Ct. at 2661 57 L.Ed.2d at 651 (citationsomitted). It stated, however, that the impact of such restrictions must be considered in order to determine whether the interference with the property "is of such a magnitude that 'there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain [itj." Id. at 136, 98 S.Ct. at 2665, 57 L.Ed.2d at 656 (quoting Pennsylvania Coa/ Co. v. 293 Mahon 260 U.S. 393 413 43 S.Ct. '293158,159,67 L Ed 322 (1922)). The Court thus concluded that the historic designation of Grand Central Terminal was not a taking because it did not in any way Interfere with the owner's "primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel." /d. at 136, 98 S.Ct. at 2662, 57 L.Ed.2d at 656. More recently in United Artists' Theater Circuit v. City of Philadelphia 535 Pa, 370, 635 A.2d 612 (1993). this Court concluded that the designation of property as historic without the consent of the owner does not constitute a taking pursuant to Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In so holding, we acknowledged that "this Court has continually turned to federal precedent for guidance in its 'taking' jurisprudence, and Indeed has adopted the analysis used by the federal courts." Id. at 377, 635 A.2d at 616. After undertaking a thorough review of our past reliance on federal caselaw, we Identified three conditions that determine whether governmental action constitutes a taking requiring just compensation. Id. at 381, 635 A.2d at 618. The condition of particular concern here is that "the means [employed by the government] must not be unduly oppressive upon the property holder, considering the economic impact of the regulation...." Id. To this end, we have recognized that "action in the form of regulation can so diminish the value of property as to constitute a taking." Id. at 379, 635 A.2d at 617 (quoting Andress V. Zoning Bd. ofAdLustmeni of Philadelphia, 410 Pa _77, 85, 188 A.2d 709, 713 (1963)) (further citation and emphasis omitted). "However, the mere fact that the regulation deprives the property owner of the most profitable use of his property is not necessarily enough to establish the owner's right to compensation." Id. In a case factually similar to the instant case, the Commonwealth Court In First Preserian Church v. City Council of York, 25 Pa. Cmwlth. 154, 360 A.2d 257 (1976), upheld the city council's denial of a permit to demolish an historic structure known as York House. In addressing the church's claim that the council's actions constituted a deprivation of property rights without due process, the Commonwealth Court adopted the test articulated by the Fifth 294 Circuit in Maher v. City of'294 New Orleans 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir.1975) cert. denied, 426_ U.S. 905, 96 S.Ct. 2225, 48 L.Ed.2d 830(1976), which required the properly owner to show "that the sale of the property was impracticable, that commercial rental could not provide a reasonable rate of return, or that other potential use of the property was foreclosed." First Presb Brian, 25 Pa. Cmwlth. at 161,_ 360 A_2d al 261 (quoting Maher, 516 F.2d at 1066). Applying that test, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the refusal of the permit to demolish the structure did not go so far as to preclude the use of York House for any purpose for which it was reasonably adapted. First Presbyterian, 25 Pa. Cmwlth. at 161,.360 A,2_dat 261. Accordingly, it held that the Church did not meet its burden of proving that the city council's actions constituted a taking without just compensation. Id. at 162, 360 A.2d at 261. Guided by the foregoing standards and the record of the proceedings below, we must conclude that the trial court erred when it held that the evidence did not support the Commission's finding that Appellees failed to prove economic hardship. The trial court noted that at the June 7, 1991, hearing [Appellees] undertook their burden of proving that, if not permitted to demolish the Gateway House, they could not make any economic use of the property, by presenting evidence to show that the cost of renovating the House would be greater than the fair market value of the House after renovations were completed. Weinberg v. City of Pittsburgh, Historic Review Comm'n, No. SA981 of 1990, slip op. at 15 (C.P. Allegheny County Nov. 29, 1993). Although the Commission determined thatAppellees failed to meet their burden, the trial court disagreed insofar as the Commission's findings were based on a partial rejection of Mr. Goldblum's testimony. Id. at 20. The Commonwealth Court found that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's conclusion that the cost of renovation as a single family residence was 295 $650,000 to $700,000. Weinberg v. City of Pittsburgh, Historic Review '295 Comm'n, 651 A.2d 1182, 1187 (Pa.Cmwlth.1994). However, like the trial court, it concluded that there was Insufficient evidence to support the Commission's finding that the cost of renovating the property would not exceed the value of the property after renovation. to. We disagree with the conclusion of the lower courts that the record does not support the httn://scholar.gooele.com/scholar case?case=7554494592469423371 &q=Pittsburgh+v +... 02/22/2011 City of Pittsburgh v. Weinberg, 676 A. 2d 207 - Pa: Supreme Court 1996 - Google Scholar Page 4 of 5 Commission's decision to deny a certificate of appropriateness. Additionally, it is apparent that both the trial court and Commonwealth Court failed to consider the circumstances surrounding Appellees' purchase of the Gateway House in reaching their decisions.As the United States Supreme Court has observed, questions concerning the economic Impact of governmental actions are essentially answered by ad hoc, factual inquiries that focus on several different factors. Penn Centra/ Trans . Co. v. New York City, 438 U.5. 104, 124,98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659 57 L.Ed.2d 2d 631 648 (1978). Two important factors identified by the Court in conducting this Inquiry are "ft]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment -backed expectations...." Id. Mr. Goldblum, Appellees' real estate expert, testified that he believed the property could be sold as It exists for between $200,000,and $300,000; as a renovated single family house for $500,000 to $550,000; and as a renovated two family residence for $500,000. (R.R. at 70a, Finding No, 9). Mr. Goldblum qualified these statements by indicating that It was impossible to know the price that the property would bring until it was put on the market and promoted "full tilt." (R.R. at 70a, Finding No. 9). When questioned further by one Commission member, Mr. Goldblum expressed an opinion that a renovated, single-family residence on the site of the Gateway House could be sold for as much as $800,000. (R. R. at 70a, Finding No. 9). Appellees assert that the present value of the property is not a relevant consideration for purposes of determining economic hardship because "any [subsequent] purchaser will be burdened with the same oppressive requirements of restoration brought about by the historic 296 designation." Brief for '296 Appellees at 20. We find this argument wholly unpersuasive. Any burden imposed on a subsequent purchaser does not affect Appellees after they receive valuable consideration for their property. Just as Greystone, the prior owner of the Gateway House, cannot now complain about the costs or complications associated with the renovation of the Gateway House, Appellees likewise cannot claim that the impediments which might confront a prospective purchaser presently impact them for purposes of proving economic hardship. Despite the unrefuted testimony of Appellees' expert that the Gateway property could be sold as it exists for between $200,000 and $300,000, the Commonwealth Court found that "(t]here is no competent evidence that the property could be sold as is for $200,000 to $300,000 because Mr. Goldblum testified there were no comparable properties upon which he could base an expert opinion." Weinberg v. City of Pittsburgh, Historic Review Comm'n, 651 A.2d 1182, 1187 (Pa.Cmwlth.1994). The Commonwealth Court Is Incorrect that Mr. Goldblum's estimate of the property's selling price was incompetent because of the lack of comparable properties. At the time that he testified, Mr. Goldblum had twenty-three years of experience in real estate with a particular emphasis on the area of Pittsburgh where the Gateway House is located as well as a strong interest in historic houses. (R.R. at 234a -235a). The Commission obviously gave greater deference to Mr. Goldblum's experience than to the fact that there were no properties comparable to the Gateway House when Mr. Goldblum rendered his opinion. We thus find support for the Commission's finding that Appellees failed to prove that it would be Impracticable or Impossible to sell their property. See First Presbyterian Church v. It should also be noted that Appellees received an inducement to purchase the Gateway House in the form of a release from a preexisting obligation to buy a townhouse from Greystone. (R.R. at 215a). Appellees had concerns about the inadequate drainage of the 297 property that they were obligated to purchase and therefore "wanted out of it." (R.R. at 215a). 297 Although it is impossible to ascribe a monetary value to this benefit, it must nonetheless be considered when evaluating the economic impact of the Commission's actions on Appellees. We see no reason to delve any further into the Commission's decision in this matter. Despite the thorough review by the trial court and Commonwealth Court of other testimony and evidence presented at the June 7, 1991, hearing, our Inquiry need not proceed beyond the point of our determination that Appellees did not meet their burden of proving that it was Impracticable or impossible to sell their property. Appellees purchased the Gateway House for $175,000 and spent approximately $36,000 on exterior repairs. The unrefuted testimony of their own expert suggests that the house could be sold for $200,000 to $300,000. That, together with tile release from the obligation to purchase the townhouse from Greystone, suggests that Appellees could conceivably realize a profit if they sold the property. In any event, Appellees have not demonstrated that they have been "deprived of any profitable use" of the property. United Artists' Theater Circuity City of Philadelphia 535 Pa. 370 382 635 A.2d 612, 618 (1993). Our decision is bolstered by the fact that prior to the time of their purchase, Appellees knew that the Gateway House had been given an historic designation and were aware of the consequences of such a designation. T.R. at 69a). The fact that they did not engage the services of an architect or contractor to estimate the cost or feasibility of restoring the Gateway House cannot serve as a basis for their claims of economic hardship after the fact. The Order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed and the decision of the Historic Review Commission of the City of Pittsburgh to deny a certificate of appropriateness is reinstated. MONTEMURO, J., who was sitting by designation, did not participate in the decision of this case. N] Specifically, the Vice President of Pittsburgh National Bank indicated hat the House appeared to be in rapid deterioration and he cost of he necessary renovations would exceed the fair market value of the House a(terthose renovations were completed. (R.R. at 84e). He did, however, stale that the bvtkw uld consider a commercial loan secured http://scholar,google.com/scholar case?case=7554494592469423371 &q=pittsburgh+v.+... 02/22/2011 City of Pittsburgh v. Weinberg, 676 A. 2d 207 - Pa: Supreme Court 1996 - Google Scholar Page 5 of 5 by other collateral. (R.R. at 84a). (2] This figure does not include an estimated $45,000 to $50,000 to consNrct a too -car garage for a single family. Go to Google Home - About Google - About Google Scholar ®2011 Gaagk WASHINGTON COUNTY PLANNING COMMJSSION Washington County Administrative Annex 80 West Baltimore Street Hagerstown, Maryland 21740-6003 Telephone: 240-313-2430 FAX: 240-313-2431 Deaf and Hard of Hearing call: 7-1-1 for Maryland Relay DATE: January20, 2011 TO�G��1pJ C bYtCAl2 FROM: Steve Goodrich, Chief Senior Planner SUBJECT: RZ-1 1-001 — Map Amendment Please find attached for your review and comments the proposed map amendment to the Zoning Ordinance for Case Number RZ-11-001 that has been filed with the Planning Commission. The amendment request will be heard at public meeting with the Planning Commission on Monday, April 4, 2011 at 7:00 PM. The location of this meeting will be determined at a later date. Please review and return your comments by no later than March 4, 2011 Comments may be returned via e-mail to sgoodrich@washco-md.net or by mail to the above address. If you have any questions, please contact me via e-mail at the above address or by phone at 240-313-2430. STG/dse Attachments 'ww,washco-md.net RECYCLED PAPER 4y V Site Site ty r:1443 IA e Site Number :1446 Site \ u� vr7�J Site Number :1478 Number :1218 �) Site Number:1234 \222 , Site Number Number :1242 Site Site Number:1236 Site Number:1241 Site Number :1238 239 Site Number:12 _ Site Number:l237 Site Number :l73 Site Number :1477 tit Site Number 182 Numb oS� Y4'6B:J Site Number x467 r :1466 m=arl n9 1O I M ` Site Numbi /-23 ,2 ITh s \ s \\ Vumber:1100 �j (flL} YTSA�ydNoRax Site Numi:1136 Site Number :1131 Site N ber.1465 Site Number :1130 r'n'OlJg9V� Site Num/b`er:1135 Site Number.1732 _4�C SlteaNu l6er 11 Site Numberr:14 6 Site Number:1118 Numbe Site Number :1121 it2Y I Site Number :1129 Site Number Site Number:1128 bite Number 11241Site Number:] it e Number :1464 Site Number EqN o�LN LD 344�GP� F� Site Numb( Site Number :1126 Site Numbi Numbe zzazflSZo04- Copy II F?A=I-235 MARYLAND HISTORICAL TRUST District 18 Map 38 Parcel 16 INVENTORY FORM FOR STATE HISTORIC SITES SURVEY HISTORIC Pam TION STREETS. NUMBER Southwest of Md. Route 60, the Leiteraburg Pike. CITY. TOWN • CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT .X. VICINITY OF Hagerstown STATE Maryland ciYaNsT iington CLASSIFICATION CATEGORY OWNERSHIP STATUS PRESENT USE _DISTRICT _PUBLIC XOCCUPIED XAGRICULTURE _MUSEUM X_BUILDINGISI X PRIVATE —UNOCCUPIED _COMMERCIAL _PARK —STRUCTURE _BOTH —WORK IN PROGRESS —EDUCATIONAL —PRIVATE RESIDENCE SITE PUBLIC ACQUISITION ACCESSIBLE —ENTERTAINMENT —RELIGIOUS _OBJECT _IN PROCESS —YES: RESTRICTED _GOVERNMENT _SCIENTIFIC —BEING CONSIDERED • _YES: UNRESTRICTED -INDUSTRIAL —TRANSPORTATION XNO —MILITARY —OTHER' DOWNER OF PROPERTY NAME Nevin M. Shank Telephone #: STREETS. NUMBER Route # 6 CITY.TOWN STATE , zip code Hagerstown _ VICINITY OF Maryland 21740 ©LOCATION OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION Liber #: 261 COURTHOUSE. Folio #: 491 REGISTRY OF DEEDSETC. Washington County Court House STREET S. NUMBER Vest Washington Street CITY. TOWN STATE Hagerstown Maryland 21740 REPRESENTATION IN EXISTING SURVEYS TITLE DATE _FEDERAL _STATE -COUNTY -LOCAL DEPOSITORY FOR SURVEY RECORDS CITY. TOWN -- STATE R DESCRIPTION CONDITION _EXCELLENT &DETERIORATED -GOOD .RUINS _FAIR _UNEXPOSED DESCRIBE THE PRESENT AND ORIGINAL c,,J/ —T-a3S CHECK ONE CHECK ONE _UNALTERED &0RIGINAL SITE LALTERED < 50% _MOVED DATF F KNOWN) PHYSICAL APPEARANCE This farm complex is located at the end of a long private lane which extends in a south- easterly direction from Maryland Route 60, the Leitersburg Pike. The buildings are set on fairly level ground just east of Marsh Run. The house and barn each face west. The dwelling is a two story, three bay frame structure sheathed with German siding and resting on fieldstone foundations: A two story ell extends to the rear. The windows and door appear to be arranged symmetrically in the front elevation. They are trimmed with grooved architraves which surround two over two pane sash windows. The centrally located entrance has a transom above the door. It is sheltered by a one story porch with a low hipped roof. The porch is supported by chamfered square posts with dec- orative scroll cut brackets and pendants. The roof is covered with corrugated sheet metal and extends beyond the end walls. Small brick chimneys with corbels at their tops are located inside each gable end. Just west of the house is a stone springhouse with a deep overhang at its north end. Openings into the springhouse have narrow mitered frames with a bead at the inside edge. A brick chimney is located inside the south end wall. Some lattice sheathing remains along the porch or overhang. North of the house is a large frame bank barn with decorative metal ventilator cupolas. Modern concrete block dairy barns and silos have been added. The barn appears to be in good condition while the other buildings are deteriorated. The farm contains 151.79 acres. CONTINUE ON SEPARATE SHEET IF NECESSARY El SIGNIFICANCE r_ PERIOD AREAS OF SIGNIFICANCE-- CHECK AND JUSTIFY BELOW !REHISTORIC _.ARCHEOLOGY -PREHISTORIC _COMMUNITY PLANNING -LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE _RELIGION -1400-1499 1RCHEOLOGY-HISTOflIC _CONSERVATION _LAW _SCIENCE _1500-1599 XAGRICULTURE -ECONOMICS -LITERATURE _SCULPTURE _1600-1699 X -ARCHITECTURE —EDUCATION _MILITARY _SOCIAL/HUMANITARIAN _1700-1799 —ART _ENGINEERING _MUSIC _THEATER $1800-1899 lateCOMMERCE _EXPLORATION/SETTLEMENT _PHILOSOPHY _TRANSPORTATION X1900- early _COMMUNICATIONS —INDUSTRY _POLITICS/GOVERNMENT _OTHER (SPECIFY) _INVENTION SPECIFIC DATES BUILDER/ARCHITECT STATEMENT OF SIGNIFICANCE These buildings provide an example of a late 19th or early 20th century farm complex. Although undated, the frame house and barn are typical of turn of the century period farm buildings. The stone springhouse which stands near the dwelling would appear to be older than the other structures. According to the Washington County Land Records, this farm was purchased by Anna C. Eckstine in 1917 from Frances Loose Smith, et al. (151/109). The farm, containing 151.79 acres was bought for $17,455.85 and was a portion of the estate of Joseph B. Loose who acquired several hundred acres of land in this area in 1854. The property was in the Eckstine family until 1943. It was purchased by the present owner in 1951. CONTINUE ON SEPARATE SHEET IF NECESSARY MAJOR BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES Washington County Land Records. CONTINUE ON SEPARATE SHEET IF NECESSARY ri GEOGRAPHICAL DATA. ACREAGE OF NOMINATED PROPERTY 151.79 acres VERBAL BOUNDARY DESCRIPTION LIST ALL STATES AND COUNTIES FOR PROPERTIES OVERLAPPING STATE OR COUNTY BOUNDARIES STATE COUNTY COUNTY ®FORM PREPARED BY NAME/TITLE Paula Stoner Dickey, Consultant ORGANIZATION DATE Washington County Historical Sites Survey November 1976 STREETS NUMBER TELEPHONE _ County Office Building, 33 West Washington Street 791-3065 CITY OR TOWN STATE Hagerstown Maryland 21740 The Maryland Historic Sites Inventory was officially created by an Act of the Maryland Legislature, to be found in the Annotated Code of Maryland, Article 41, Section 181 KA, 1974 Supplement. The Survey and Inventory are being prepared for information and record purposes only and do not constitute any infringe- ment of individual property rights. RETURN TO: Maryland Historical Trust The Shaw House, 21 State Circle Annapolis, Maryland 21401 (301) 267-1438 Ps• t bs jlY 4 \� <m ,\ \ : , © <y \ ' :........ � \»� � » y- � y \\ \ .